Homo sapiens, the human species- we are blessed with the so-called “high intelligence” that makes us unique from other species of animals and with such a distinction, we have also come to believe that humans are born to have an inalienable moral status. However, what about other non-human animal species? What justifies whether or not non-humans have a moral status ? An answer to this question has been debated endlessly by philosophers, moral activists and legal practitioners concerned with the treatment of non-human animal species.
One of the major arguments for the rights of animals by moral philosopher Peter Singer stems from the consequentialist theory of utilitarianism. In this argument, the rightnessof an action is purely determined by the outcome , implying that the aim is to maximise pleasure and minimise suffering in the outcome. Singer applied this concept to animal rights. According to Singer, human interests and non-human animal interests are of equal standing and prioritising one over another could be considered speciesism. The term was coined by Richard Ryder in the 1970s to define the prevalence of human centered prejudice, in which humans paradoxically deem their own species as morally superior to all others, despite being the ones making this judgement. Singer argued that since non-human animals are just as capable of experiencing pleasure and pain, causing unnecessary suffering to animals is considered morally unjustifiable. The right of minimised suffering then became a foundational claim for the moral status of animals.
The opposing view for this topic states that only moral beings who are capable of making moral choices deserve a moral status. However, philosopher Tom Regan countered this by pointing out that this criteria would exclude certain groups of human beings as well because a being deserving of moral consideration should not only have moral rights but also be held responsible for their actions. Groups of people such as young children and the people with mental disabilities should then not be granted moral status. Instead, Regan argued that moral consideration should be determined by whether the being is a “subject of a life”, meaning that they have properties such as perception and memory, a sense of time as well as emotions, which include the ability to experience pleasure and pain. These beings are then entitled to certain rights, particularly liberty and bodily integrity. Regan’s philosophy was seen by many as extreme because it encouraged absolute abolition of practices such as animal farming, experimentation and performances, all which treat animals as resources.
Moreover, whilemost animal rights arguments inadvertently focus on animals, perhaps we can view the problem from a rather character based approach. Rosalind Hursthouse, a virtue ethicists, suggests that by establishing a good moral character, we will come to treat animals with respect. This relational approach reinforces the fact that our interactions with animals are a reflection of our moral character and societal values.
To conclude, us human beings can never fully understand what being a non-human animal in our world is truly like, which is why there is so much discussion about the rights of animals. However, all philosophical arguments converge on a common ground that animals are deserving of moral consideration. On our earth where humans have become the dominating species, these philosophical arguments drive us to reconsider our treatment of animals. The case for the moral status of animals is then both compelling and increasingly urgent.
Bibliography:
Comments